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NOTE AND COMMENT
CAN AFFIDAVITS OF JURORS TO SHow MIscoNDucT BE ADmITTED FOR THE
PURPosE or SETTING AsmE A "QuoTmNT VERDIcT?'--A recent Oklahoma case
raises one phase of a question which has been perplexing the courts ever since
jury trials were invented, and in regard to which -there is a great contrariety
of opinion. After a verdict had been rendered for the plaintiff in a personal
injury suit, the defendant made a motion 'for a new trial on the ground of
misconduct of the jury, and in support of his motion offered the affidavits of
several of the jurors to the effect that the verdict was determined upon as
the result of an agreement whereby each one of the jurors was to set down
on paper the sum to which -he thought the plaintiff entitled, the final verdict to
consist of the amount obtained by dividing the sum of the respective amounts
so set down by the number of jurors. The trial court refused to hear these
affidavits and its ruling was sustained by -the supreme court on the ground
of public policy. Tvlsa Street Railway Co. v. Jacobson (Okl. 1913), 136
Pac. 410.
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While it is universally conceded that such a verdict is illegal and void
where, as in the principal case, the jurors agree in advance to be bound by the
result, yet in a great many courts the law will not, on a supposed ground of
public policy, allow the fact to be shown by the only evidence by which in
most cases it can be shown, viz., the affidavits of the. jurors themselves.
Owen v. Warburton, i Bos. & Pul. (N. P.), 326; Burgess v. Langley, 5 Man.
& Gr. 72-; Vasie v. Delaval, i T. R. ii; Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns (N. Y.)
487; Wilson V. Berryan. 5 Cal. 45 (Now changed by statute); State v. Des-
noyer, i Minn. T56, 61 Am. Dec. 494; Pleasants v. Heard, I5 Ark. 403; Heath
v. Conway, i Bibb. (Ky.) 398; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 85; Dorr v. Fenno,
12 Pick. (-Mass.) 521; Sawyer v. Railroad, 37 Mo. 24o; Handley v. Leigh, 8
Tex. i29; Sheppard v. Lark, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 576; Schwamb Lbr. Co. v.
Schaar, 94 Ill. App. 544; Montgomery St. Ry. Co. v. Mason, 133 Ala. 508. In
Kentucky it has been held the affidavits of jurors may be received to show
that a verdict was arrived at by lot but for no other purpose. Gartland v.
Conner, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 92o. "The grounds stated for the rejection of such
affidavits have usually been, first, because they would tend to defeat the
solemn act of the juror under oath; second, because their admission would
open the door to tamper with jurymen after their discharge; 'third, it -would
furnish to dissatisfied and corrupt jurors the means of destroying the verdict
to which they assented." Chicago Sanitary District v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385;
Taylor v. Garnett, i1O Ind. 287.
It seems almost incredible that so many courts should still adhere to this
antiquated belief in the sanctity of the jury, when justice and common sense
combine to demand a more liberal interpretation of their functions. To make
the apprehension of their misconduct dependent upon -the chance discovery of
some eaves-dropper is to perpetuate the very evils which the jury system ,was
designed to eliminate. To be sure these affidavits must be received with
caution, for altoo liberal rule would lead to the same unfortunate result from
the opposite -direction. What is perhaps the true view and the one most
consistent with sound principles of justice is that which prevails in a few of
our courts, and which is to the effect that while affidavits of jurors will -not
be received to show any fact resting in the personal consciousness of the
juror, they will be received to establish the commission of any overt act,
whether done within or outside the jury room. The reasonableness and
feasibility of -this rule is well shown by the following statement of it in Perry
v. Bailey, 12 Kans. 539. "Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the
personal consciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow the
verdict, because being personal it is not accessible to other ,testimony; it gives
the secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of
twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith on 'the part of a minority; to
induce apparent acquiescence with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to
induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the verdict. But as ,to
overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors; if one
affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny it. One cannot disturb the
action of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one for the eleven may be
heard."
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This statement of the rule -was quoted -with approval -by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Mattox v. U. S., 146 U. S. 14o,
where it was held that the affidavitg of jurors were receivable to show that a
newspaper account of the trial was read by the jury before they rendered
their verdict. Whether the rendering of a "Quotient Verdict" would be held
to come within the rule as adopted by the Federal courts is somewhat -in
doubt by reason of a recent decision in one of the District courts wherein
its application to such a state of facts was denied. The court in that case,
while recognizing the rule, said that this was a matter inhering in the verdict
itself, and was therefore not an overt act in the sense contemplated by the
Supreme Court in the Mattox case. McDonald v. Pless, 2o6 Fed. 263. The
state courts which have. adopted this more liberal procedure have, however,
come to a different conclusion and have held that the rendition of a "Quotient
Verdict" is within the operation of the rule. Joyce v. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.)
273; Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379; Johnson v. Husband, 22 Kans.
277. It is believed that the view taken by the state courts is sound, for this
is an act necessarily known to all the jurors and consequently is capable of
easy proof; it is not something present only in the consciousness of the indi-
vidual juror and influencing the motives which induce him to find for the
one party or the other.
In a few jurisdictions the rigor of the old practice has -been modified
some-what by statutes which provide that .the testimony of jurors may be
employed to show that a verdict was obtained by chance. It is, (however,
seldom that the statutes have gone any farther than this, 'but the courts in
construing them 'have quite uniformly held that a "Quotient Verdict" is a
chance verdict within the terms of the statute. Dixon v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384,
35 Am. St. Rep. i8o, overruling Turner v. Water Co., 25 Cal. 398; Gordon v.
Trevanthan, 13 Mont. 387; Flood v. McChre, 3 Idaho 587; Long v. Collins,
12 S. D. 621; Pawnee Ditch Co. v. Adams, i Colo. App. 25o; Goodman v.
Cody, i Wash. T. 329. See also Block v. Telephone Co., 26 Utah 451.
G. C. G.
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